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2A-11/30/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-39 61 




NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
j 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
ANTHONY DE ROSA, ESQ., for Joint Employer 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Dutchess 
County Deputy Sheriffs Police Benevolent Association (PBA). The 
PBA, on May 15, 1992, filed a petition seeking to represent 
certain employees of the County of Dutchess and the Dutchess 
County Sheriff (Joint Employer) and to decertify the New York 
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State Federation of Police, Inc. (Federation) .-1 The Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissed the petition on the merits. 
The Federation opposes the petition filed by the PBA, 
claiming that the existing unit is most appropriate. The Joint 
Employer supports the PBA's uniting position, but offered no 
evidence in support of its position. The PBA argued to the 
Director that the Federation had, in settlement of an earlier 
representation petition, consented to the establishment of a 
separate unit for deputy sheriffs and was estopped from opposing 
its petition. The PBA also argued that its petition for a 
separate unit for the deputy sheriffs should be granted because 
the Federation had not provided them with adequate 
representation. 
The Director held that the Federation was not estopped from 
taking a position regarding the composition of the most 
appropriate unit and that the PBA had not established its claim 
that the Federation had systematically and intentionally 
disregarded the deputy sheriffs' interests, which would warrant 
their fragmentation. Accordingly, he dismissed the petition. 
-'The PBA seeks to fragment the existing unit and represent a 
unit which would consist of only the following titles: deputy 
sheriff, deputy sheriff sergeant, deputy sheriff lieutenant, 
deputy sheriff-civil, deputy sheriff sergeant-civil and deputy 
sheriff lieutenant-civil. The deputy sheriff-civil series, also 
known as civil deputies, are unrepresented titles; the deputy 
sheriff series, also known as road patrol deputies, are in the 
unit represented by the Federation. 
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The PBA excepts to the Director's determination on the facts 
and the law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the 
Director's decision, in part, but reverse his dismissal of the 
petition and remand the case to him for further processing. 
The Federation has been the representative of the existing 
unit since 1984. The Federation and the Joint Employer were 
parties to collective bargaining agreements for January 1, 1986 
to December 31, 1988, and from January 1, 198 8 to December 31, 
1992.^ 
In 1990, a decertification petition for the existing unit 
was filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) 
mounting a challenge to the Federation. The Federation and the 
Joint Employer were then negotiating the 1988-1992 collective 
bargaining agreement, but those negotiations stopped after CSEA's 
petition was filed. Sometime after the petition was filed, a 
meeting was called by the Federation's attorney, Kenneth 
Franzblau, to discuss resolution of the representation question. 
Franzblau and John Henry, vice-president of the Federation, and 
two other Federation members, met with Adam Nowik, Jr., president 
of the PBA, and John Witenberg and Michael Sariganis, unit 
members. No one from CSEA was present. Nowik testified that an 
agreement resulted from that meeting, under which CSEA would 
withdraw the petition and "that the Federation in return would 
consent to dividing us into two separate units within the 
-''Negotiations for a successor to the 1988-1992 contract were 
suspended once the instant petition was filed. 
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Federation and returning the civilian employees, clericals, to 
the CSEA unit."-7 The unit separation was to take effect at the 
end of the contract. 
The PBA argued to the Director that the Federation's 
agreement to the establishment of two separate units estops it 
from opposing the instant petition. The Director rejected this 
argument, finding that even if the Federation had earlier given 
its agreement to two separate units, it was not precluded from 
asserting a different position in a representation proceeding 
before PERB because such an estoppel might limit PERB in the 
discharge of its statutory obligation to define the most 
appropriate unit. 
We find on the facts of this case that the Federation is not 
estopped from raising a unit appropriateness argument. 
Withdrawal of the earlier petition was not conditioned upon 
execution or implementation of that agreement. Further, the 
agreement itself is unclear, both in its actual wording and in 
its intent. As the record does not clearly establish the 
^Franzblau memorialized the agreement in a handwritten note that 
he copied and distributed at the meeting. It provided: 
Negotiations would continue from the mediator 
proposal/last offer. Upon signing of the contract all 
parties will consent to the establishment of separate 
bargaining units as petitioned for by the CSEA on July, 
1990 w/NYS PERB. All parties will consent to the 
inclusion of civilian employees in the current county-
wide unit represented by CSEA at the end of the 
negotiated contract. The two separate bargaining units 
will remain as members of the United Federation of 
Police, Inc. 
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Federation's unconditional agreement to fragment, no basis for an 
estoppel is present. Therefore, we affirm the Director's 
determination to allow the Federation to present its uniting 
position in this case.-7 
Turning to the merits of the fragmentation petition, we 
have, in several previous cases,-7 determined that deputy 
sheriffs are not appropriately fragmented from existing units 
which include other sheriff's department employees. For example, 
in County of Warren-7 we stated: 
We have previously considered and rejected the claim 
that there is an inherent conflict of interest between 
the responsibilities of road patrol deputies and 
correction officers in a sheriff's department 
warranting fragmentation of an overall unit of 
sheriff's department employees. Rather, we have 
recognized that the common "law enforcement" 
responsibilities of deputy sheriffs and correction 
officers, by whatever title, warrant a single unit for 
both, (footnote omitted) 
The PBA presented evidence of two incidents, which it 
asserts establish that the deputies received disparate or 
inadequate representation by the Federation. We affirm the 
Director's determination that the evidence presented by the PBA 
-
7We do not here decide whether we would find an estoppel if the 
facts were different. See State of New York (Div. of State 
Police) , 15 PERB 53014 (1982) . 
-
7See County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 25 PERB 53062 
(1992) ; County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 22 PERB 53055 
(1989) ; County of Albany and Albany County Sheriff, 19 PERB 53054 
(1986) ; County of Albany and Albany County Sheriff, 15 PERB 53008 
(1982); County of Schenectady and Sheriff of Schenectady County, 
14 PERB 53013 (1981) . 
£/21 PERB 53037, at 3081 (1988). 
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was not sufficient to establish that the deputies had been so 
"systematically and intentionally disregarded"-'' by the 
Federation as to warrant their fragmentation from the overall 
unit. 
One incident involved Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Gary Corbett. 
He testified that in August 1990, the Joint Employer had changed 
its practice of allowing deputy sheriffs in the rank of sergeant 
or lieutenant to work "details" for overtime opportunities. He 
contacted Shelly Love-Ciraolo, a Federation employee, who sent 
him a completed grievance form to sign and submit. Corbett did 
so and sent Love-Ciraolo copies of his immediate supervisors' 
denials of the grievance. The grievance was denied by the 
Sheriff. Corbett forwarded the Sheriff's decision to Love-
Ciraolo in September 199 0, without making any request for any 
further action. This was Corbett's last contact with the 
Federation, although he testified that Love-Ciraolo had assured 
him at some point earlier that the Federation would support the 
grievance through the County Executive step and, if necessary, to 
arbitration. 
Corbett also testified about a conversation he had with a 
Federation attorney during which the attorney told him that there 
was also an excellent case for an improper practice charge based 
on the events which crave rise to the grievance. Corbett thought 
z/County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 25 PERB f3062, at 3133 
(1992), citing State of New York (Long Island Park and Historical 
Preservation Comm'n) , 22 PERB J[3043, at 3099 (1989) . 
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that the attorney would file such a charge with PERB and, at the 
attorney's request, Corbett gave him the number Love-Ciraolo had 
assigned to the grievance by the Federation. At the attorney's 
suggestion, he also sent Love-Ciraolo the paper work he had 
accumulated in pursuing the grievance. He could not remember the 
identity of the attorney, the time or place of the conversation, 
or any other details of the conversation. 
The second incident relied upon by the PBA in its effort to 
establish inadequate representation by the Federation of the 
deputy sheriffs involves a lawsuit alleging violations by the 
Joint Employer of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 
The Federation commenced the lawsuit on behalf of ninety 
correction officers and twenty-five deputy sheriffs.-'' The 
lawsuit involved three allegations: that employees were not paid 
for a required ten-minute lineup time; that correction officers 
were required to take a thirty-minute unpaid lunch break during 
each shift at the jail; and that all employees were required to 
undergo training at times outside their normal work hours and in 
excess of their forty-hour workweek, without overtime 
compensation. 
The pendency of the lawsuit was used as a bargaining tool by 
the Federation during negotiations for the 1988-92 collective 
bargaining agreement. However, shortly after the commencement of 
-'Each employee was a named plaintiff. 
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the lawsuit, the Joint Employer began paying overtime to those 
employees undergoing training outside of their regular workday. 
In January 1991, the Joint Employer moved for summary judgment in 
the lawsuit on the grounds that correction officers had always 
been paid for their lunch breaks and that the Joint Employer was 
paying overtime for time spent in training in excess of forty 
hours per week. Thus, the only issue still in dispute was line-
up pay. The Federation thereafter agreed with the Joint Employer 
to discontinue the lawsuit in exchange for the payment, 
prospectively, for line-up time for employees, as well as 
agreement on the successor contract, which included salary 
increases and other benefits for the whole unit. The Joint 
Employer conditioned agreement on the contract upon the 
withdrawal of the lawsuit. The Federation left all unit 
employees a release form at their work stations to be executed 
and returned to the Federation. Most of the employees signed the 
releases. After the Federation's attorney advised the court that 
most plaintiffs had signed the releases, the court directed the 
Federation to publish notification to those who had not signed 
that the lawsuit had been settled and that those who desired to 
pursue it further would have to submit to the court written 
Board - C-3961 
notification of their intention to continue the lawsuit 
individually.-7 
The notice was posted, apparently by the Federation, with 
the names of the seven employees—'' who had not signed releases, 
and the following statement: 
As of June 18, 1991 the following employees...have not 
signed off on this lawsuit. There is a possibility 
that as a result of these people not signing off, it 
could result in our negotiated contract with the County 
being voided. Should that occur it would cost the 
average employee...approximately $5,000 in backpay. 
TALK TO THESE PEOPLE. 
Three of the named employees, all deputy sheriffs, wanted to 
continue the lawsuit to obtain line-up pay, retroactively, and 
consulted an attorney. That attorney attempted to contact the 
Federation's attorney for information about the lawsuit. There 
was no response from the Federation's attorney to the messages 
left for him. Additionally, Nowik contacted the Federation's 
chief delegate for help in getting copies of the court papers. 
2/ The notice stated: 
If you are a Plaintiff, and have not agreed to settle 
this action, written notice of your intention to 
proceed with the Litigation must be received in the 
office of Edward L. Ford, Esg., 175 Main Street, Suite 
4 01, White Plains, New York 10601 on or before July 15, 
1991. 
Further, two of the three issues involved in this suit 
have been resolved in favor of the Defendant, and the 
New York State Federation of Police, Inc. has decided 
not to pursue this litigation or to provide counsel. 
Those Plaintiffs choosing to continue this litigation 
will be responsible for all future litigation costs 
including attorneys' fees. 
—'Six were deputy sheriffs and one was a correction officer. 
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He was told that if any employees wanted to continue the lawsuit, 
they would have to do so on their own. 
The Director determined that the PBA had failed to establish 
a systematic and intentional disregard for the interests of the 
deputy sheriffs which would warrant the fragmentation of the 
existing, long-standing unit.—7 He found that the two 
incidents presented by the PBA in the eight years of otherwise 
adequate representation by the Federation were insufficient to 
establish that the interests of the deputy sheriffs had been 
"disregarded or ignored out of hand".—' There is, for 
example, no record evidence to support such an assertion. 
Neither is there evidence that Corbett had clearly conveyed to 
the Federation that he wanted to pursue the grievance to the next 
step or to file an improper practice charge. We cannot find on 
this record that the Federation ignored Corbett's grievance 
because he was a deputy sheriff or failed to answer his inquiries 
as to its status, because he made no inquiries in those 
respects.—7 
As to the second incident, the settlement of the FLSA 
lawsuit was to the benefit of the whole unit. Even the PBA 
concedes in its exceptions that "the Federation's policy decision 
^County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 22 PERB 113055 (1989) . 
•^County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 25 PERB f3062, at 3133 
(1992) . 
—
7See Nassau Educ. Chapter of the Svosset Cent. Sch. Dist. Unit, 
CSEA, Inc. , 11 PERB ?[3010 (1978) . 
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to settle the FLSA case is not, by itself, proof of inadequate 
representation." It would have this Board conclude from that 
decision, however, that the Federation's decision was motivated 
by its desire to benefit the correction officers, at the expense 
of the deputy sheriffs. The record does not support such a 
conclusion. Indeed, the unit members themselves, including the 
majority of the deputy sheriffs, concurred in the decision to 
withdraw the lawsuit by signing the releases. The remaining 
employees were given clear instructions in the notice of 
discontinuance on how to proceed. That the Federation attorney 
may not have returned the phone calls of some of the plaintiffs 
or their attorney and that a Federation delegate was reluctant to 
; offer assistance does not evidence a pattern of ignoring the 
interests of the deputy sheriffs in favor of the interests of the 
correction officers which would be necessary to support a 
decision to fragment a long-standing unit. 
Were we to limit our analysis to inadequate representation, 
we would affirm the Director's dismissal of the petition. 
However, effective January 1, 1990, the New York Constitution, 
Article XIII, §13(a), was amended to delete the provision 
exempting a county from responsibility for the acts of a sheriff. 
As we noted in County of Nassau and Nassau County Sheriff;—7 
—
725 PERB 13036, at 3075 (1992), citing Thoubboron v. New York 
State Dep't of Civil Service. 79 N.Y.2d 982 (1992). 
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[T]he purpose of this constitutional amendment was to 
relieve sheriffs throughout the State of personal 
liability for their acts or omissions and for the acts 
or omissions of their appointees in discharging 
official duties relating to civil process. 
We further noted that the court in Thoubboron had held that the 
effect of the amendment was to bring even those deputies who 
performed civil functions into the classified civil service. We 
have not yet had the opportunity to consider the effect, if any, 
of the constitutional amendment on the civil service 
classifications and, possibly, duties of deputy sheriffs. In 
addition, upon reconsideration of our fragmentation decisions 
regarding sheriff's department personnel, we believe that the 
"law enforcement" responsibilities and duties of deputy sheriffs 
and other sheriff's department employees may be sufficient to 
warrant the establishment of a separate unit of deputy sheriffs. 
The typical duties of deputy sheriffs, which may include 
patrolling in a police vehicle or on foot, investigating 
suspicious activities, making arrests, maintaining order in 
crowds and public gatherings and answering questions for the 
public, may fairly be considered to be police work. As we 
acknowledged in City of Amsterdam:—/ "The policeman deals 
almost wholly with human relations.... The police service is 
concerned with the broad spectrum of human rights, public order, 
and the protection of life and property." We there fragmented an 
existing unit and created separate units of police and fire 
^
710 PERB f3031, at 3061 (1977). 
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fighters, based upon the distinct responsibilities of police 
officers, despite the "public safety" responsibilities of both 
groups. The law enforcement duties of deputy sheriffs may 
justify a separate bargaining unit for them based upon an 
arguable unique community of interest and/or actual or potential 
conflict of interest with other employees in the Sheriff's 
Department who may not have any similar duties. 
Given our previously articulated standards, the focus of the 
Director's investigation in this case was, properly, whether the 
deputy sheriffs had been inadequately represented. As a result, 
there is little evidence in this record about the civil service 
classifications, distinct duties, responsibilities and working 
conditions of the deputy sheriffs and other employees of the 
Joint Employer. In order to determine the most appropriate unit, 
the matter must be remanded to the Director to take evidence 
relative to a community or conflict of interest among the deputy 
sheriffs and others in the Sheriff's Department. The Director 
should then issue a determination based on the evidence submitted 
pursuant to the remand. Upon receipt of the Director's findings, 
we will issue a final decision in this matter. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the PBA's exceptions relating 
to the Director's determination that there had been adequate 
representation of the deputy sheriffs are dismissed and that the 
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petition is remanded to the Director for further processing 
consistent with this decision. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
2B-11/30/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS CUMMARO, et al. , 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14398 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION SUPERIOR OFFICERS' 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Charging Parties 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Thomas Cummaro, 
and five other employees (charging parties) of the County of 
Westchester (County) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
their charge that the Westchester County Department of Correction 
Superior Officers' Association, Inc. (Association) had violated 
its duty of fair representation under §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The charge as filed by the charging parties alleges that the 
Association had commenced a lawsuit against the County to compel 
it to fill all supervisory vacancies and to have a decision made 
as to which of two eligible lists should be utilized by the 
County. It is alleged that one list is two and one half years 
old and has no minority candidates, and that the second list was 
certified in July 1992 and contains some minority officers. The 
charge appears to allege that the Association met and decided 
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that its position in the lawsuit would be that the earlier list 
should be used to fill the vacancies. The charging parties 
allege that the Association violated its by-laws by holding the 
meeting and vote, by failing to give the charging parties, upon 
request, a copy of the minutes of the meeting and by failing to 
support the charging parties.-7 The charging parties were 
notified by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) that the charge was 
deficient because PERB did not have jurisdiction over internal 
union affairs, such as violations of an employee organization's 
constitution or by-laws. 
The charging parties then filed a clarification which 
alleges that the Association denied them information of a type 
which it had previously provided to other union members. The 
Assistant Director then informed the charging parties that, while 
the Association would have an obligation to provide information 
about the lawsuit if it had previously provided similar 
information to other members of the unit, the charging parties 
had provided no facts to support that allegation. The charging 
parties thereafter filed a second clarification, reiterating the 
allegations in the original charge and first clarification, but 
providing no facts in support of those allegations.-7 
1/The charging parties are apparently all on the July 1992 list, 
but not on the earlier list. 
-
7In the second amendment, the charging parties alleged that they 
had requested information regarding dates and places of meetings, 
minutes of meetings and information regarding lawsuits brought on 
behalf of unit members. 
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The Director then dismissed the charge, finding that PERB 
had no jurisdiction to regulate internal union affairs, that an 
employee organization does not violate the Act per se by its 
support of some union members to the detriment of others, and 
that the charging parties had no right established by the Act to 
the requested information, unless it had also been provided to 
others. Since no facts had been pled which would support a 
finding of discriminatory treatment, that allegation was also 
dismissed. 
The charging parties' exceptions assert that it is a breach 
of the duty of fair representation for an employee organization 
to fail to provide information to minority members so that they 
can determine whether to file a grievance or improper practice 
charge on their own and that the Director's decision must be 
reversed. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
decision in part, reverse in part, and remand it to him for 
further processing. 
We have previously held that the deprivation of membership 
rights and privileges of union members are internal union affairs 
which lie outside our jurisdiction.-'' We, therefore, find no 
violation of the Act in the alleged violation by the Association 
of members' rights under its by-laws. 
Additionally, a union's decision to support a position which 
is detrimental to certain unit members and beneficial to others 
5/See Cove Neck Police Benevolent Ass'n. 24 PERB ?[3028, at 3057 
(1991). 
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§209-a.2(c) of the Act.-7 Therefore, we affirm the Director's 
dismissal of that part of the charge. 
We find, however, that the charging parties' allegation that 
the Association refused or failed to provide them with copies of 
the notice, the minutes of the in-issue union meeting, the 
lawsuit and the eligibility list(s) may set forth a violation of 
the Act, if proven and found directly relevant to their 
employment rights and obligations. 
We have not had occasion to decide whether and to what 
extent a union owes a duty to unit employees to provide them, on 
request, with information which is relevant to their employment 
relationship.-7 However, the National Labor Relations Board and 
the courts have issued several decisions which, while not binding 
on this Board,-7 provide guidance. The U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Air Line Pilots Association International v. O'Neill,-7 
(hereafter Pilots Association) reiterated that a union's 
^
7AFSCME, Council 66, Local 93 0, 25 PERB [^3070 (1992) ; UFT, 
Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO, 18 PERB ^3048 (1985) ; South Huntington 
United Aides, 17 PERB f3012 (1984). 
^
7In Public Employees Fed'n fMurgali), 14 PERB ^3036 (1981), the 
Board affirmed the dismissal of a charge that a union had 
violated the Act by failing to provide information about a 
proposed contract to a nonmember, finding the information sought 
to be in the nature of a status report, which the union was not 
obligated to provide to nonmembers. That case differs factually 
from the one before us, but did hold that a union may not 
misinform unit members. However, to the extent that dicta in the 
footnotes may suggest that there is no duty under the Act to 
furnish information to unit members, upon request, about a 
proposed contract, we decline to adopt it. 
-
7Ad Hoc Committee of Regents College Degrees and Examinations 
Professional Employees, 24 PERB 56501 (1991). 
Z/
 U.S. , 136 LRRM 2721 (1991). 
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statutory role as exclusive bargaining representative gives it a 
power to act on behalf of others, which "involves the assumption 
toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and 
behalf."-7 The Court in Pilots Association analogized the duty 
of fair representation owed by a union to unit members to the 
duty owed by fiduciaries to their beneficiaries, trustees to 
trust beneficiaries, corporate officers and directors to 
shareholders or lawyers to clients. The Court has repeatedly 
identified three components of the duty: "to serve the interests 
of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to 
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and 
to avoid arbitrary conduct."-7 We have held, and the courts 
have agreed, in numerous cases, that an identical standard is 
applicable in duty of fair representation cases brought under the 
Act.—7 As under federal law, in New York, a union's duty stems 
from its status as the exclusive representative of designated 
units of employees.—7 
g/Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co., 323 U.S. 192, 
202, 15 LRRM 708, 712 (1944). 
g/Vaca v. Sipes. 386 U.S. 171, 177, 64 LRRM 2369, 2371 (1967). 
—
/See, e.g., Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. PERB, 132 
A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB f7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 796, 
21 PERB f7017 (1988); Svmanski v. East Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist.f 
117 A.D.2d 18, 19 PERB 57516 (2d Dep't 1986); AFSCME, Council 66, 
Local 93 0, 25 PERB 5(3070 (1992) ; Professional Staff Congress, 23 
PERB 53030 (1990); State of New York and New York State Public 
Employees Fed'n, 22 PERB 53049 (1989). 
—
7The Act was amended in 1989 to make all recognized or certified 
unions the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit they 
represent. 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 91 (effective May 22, 1989). 
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In the private sector, it has become well-established that 
the duty of fair representation requires unions to provide the 
employees they represent with information regarding their terms 
and conditions of employment. In International Union of 
Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture 
Workers,—/ the NLRB, in confirming that the duty of fair 
representation includes the obligation to provide information to 
unit employees regarding, in that case, a union security clause, 
referred to the union's fiduciary relationship with its employees 
as defined by the Supreme Court and held: 
The basis for the "fiduciary" obligation analogy is the 
union's comprehensive authority as exclusive bargaining 
representative, the cornerstone of representation under 
the Act. Because this comprehensive authority "leads 
inevitably to employee dependence on the labor 
organization,"(footnote omitted) the Board and courts 
require exclusive representatives to notify employees 
they represent of matters affecting their employment. 
The NLRB has extended this duty beyond informing unit 
members about union security clauses. In Law Enforcement and 
Security Officers, Local 4 06,^ the NLRB held that a union's 
refusal to provide a unit employee with a copy of the collective 
bargaining agreement and its health and welfare plan, to enable 
him to ascertain his eligibility for certain benefits, was a 
breach of the duty, noting that: 
Employees must rely on their union to represent them 
fairly in all matters covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement, which controls the terms and 
conditions of their employment. However, when a union 
denies the employees it represents the opportunity to 
^311 NLRB 105 (May 28, 1993). 
^109 LRRM 1162, 1164 (1982). 
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examine its agreement with their employer, it severely 
limits the employees ability to determine whether they 
have been afforded the fair representation which is 
their due. 
The NLRB has similarly found a violation when a union fails to 
inform employees of contract interpretations or changes clearly 
affecting their employment. In Teamsters, Local 896 (Anheuser-
Busch) ,—' a violation was found when the union failed to 
provide an employee with requested information about the contract 
which she allegedly needed to pursue her own grievance to 
arbitration. The NLRB decided that the employee was entitled to 
the requested information, citing to Teamsters, Local 282 
(Transit-Mix Concrete).—' which held that "a union's duty of 
fair representation imposes on it the duty not to purposely keep 
employees uninformed or misinformed concerning their grievances 
or matters affecting employment." 
Although decisions of the NLRB are not binding on this 
agency,—/ we have adopted the NLRB's rationale when we consider 
it to be persuasive and consistent with the purposes and policies 
of the Act.—7 The rationale articulated by the Supreme Court 
and the NLRB in the cases cited above is fully applicable to duty 
of fair representation cases arising under the Act. We here 
hold, therefore, that an exclusive representative violates its 
duty of fair representation when it fails or refuses to provide 
^280 NLRB 685, 124 LRRM 1063, 1986 WL 53961, at 18 (1986). 
^
;267 NLRB 1130, 114 LRRM 1148, 1150 (1983). 
i^Act, §209-a.4. 
—
/See, e.cr. , Regents College, supra note 6. 
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unit employees with requested information directly relevant to 
their employment. However, the obligation to provide requested 
information is not absolute. Just as an employee organization is 
dependent upon a public employer for information necessary to 
process grievances or negotiate and administer a collective 
bargaining agreement, so too is the unit employee dependent upon 
the employee organization for information about his or her 
employment rights and obligations. It follows, therefore, that 
the standard used to determine whether information requested by 
an employee organization should be provided by the employer 
should apply in determining a unit employee's entitlement to 
information from a union. As we outlined in City School District 
of the City of Albany,—7 the duty to grant the request will be 
based upon its reasonableness, which will be evaluated based upon 
the burden upon the [party] to provide the information, 
the availability of the information elsewhere, the 
necessity therefor, the relevancy thereof and finally, 
that the information supplied need not be in the form 
requested as long as it satisfies the demonstrated 
need. 
The Director held that the Association had no obligation, as 
a matter of law, to provide any of the requested information. 
Therefore, no assessment was made about the reasonableness of the 
charging parties' request and whether it met the criteria 
established in City School District of the City of Albany, supra. 
It is necessary, therefore, to remand the charge to the Director 
^'6 PERB H3012, at 3030 (1973). 
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for further consideration and processing consistent with this 
decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed as to his findings that PERB has no jurisdiction over 
internal union affairs and that an employee organization does not 
breach its duty of fair representation per se when it takes a 
position which benefits some unit members to the detriment of 
others, absent a showing of discrimination or improper 
motivation. The charging parties7 exceptions are dismissed as to 
those findings. The exceptions are granted as to the Director's 
decision that, as a matter of law, an employee organization has 
no obligation to provide unit members with requested information 
regarding their employment relationship. The charge, in that 
respect only, is remanded to the Director for further processing 
consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Lu'line R. fcinsella, C Paulin hairperson 
L. Eisenberg, Membar 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member | 
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STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
and ROSWELL PARK MEMORIAL INSTITUTE), 
Respondent. 
PETER M. YURKEWICZ and EDWARD GIBLIN, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD J. 
DAUTNER of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York (Department of Health and Roswell Park Memorial 
Institute) (State) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on two charges filed by the New York State Public Employees 
Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). 
In U-11327, PEF alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(a), 
(c) and (d) of -the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused PEF's demand for certain medical patient 
complaint forms. Those complaints were the basis for a 
counseling memorandum issued to a unit employee who subsequently 
filed both a contract and noncontract grievance pursuant to the 
CASE NOS. U-11327 
& U-11518 
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parties' collective bargaining agreement.-7 The ALT held that 
the patient complaint forms were relevant to PEF's investigation 
and prosecution of the grievances and that they were not 
confidential. Accordingly, the ALT held that the State violated 
its duty to negotiate under §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. The ALT also 
held that the refusal to provide the documents interfered with 
the employee's fundamental right to be represented in grievances, 
in per se violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act.-7 
In U-11518, PEF alleges that the State questioned the unit 
employee regarding her communications with her PEF grievance 
representative, Peter M. Yurkewicz. The nature of certain of 
Yurkewicz's comments during the processing of the grievances and 
a follow-up internal investigation led the State to believe that 
the unit employee may have released patient medical information 
to Yurkewicz. The State asked the employee, with Yurkewicz 
present and over his objection, whether she had released patient 
medical information to Yurkewicz, or knew who may have, whether 
she had the patients' permission to release information and 
whether she was aware of the definition of professional 
misconduct. The employee indicated to the State's representative 
-'The grievance alleges that the counseling memorandum 
constitutes a disciplinary reprimand and that it contains threats 
against the employee without just cause. Noncontract grievances 
are filed regarding disputes concerning terms and conditions of 
employment which are not covered by the parties' contract. 
Contract grievances may proceed to arbitration, but noncontract 
grievances cannot. 
-''The ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(c) allegation and no exceptions 
have been taken to that aspect of the ALT's decision. 
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that.she had a basic understanding of professional misconduct, 
but had not released any patient information, did not know who 
may have done so and had not secured the patients' permission to 
release any information. The questioning stopped at that point. 
The AKJ held that the State violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of 
the Act-7' by questioning the employee. In reaching this 
conclusion, the ALJ held that the State's questioning was not 
privileged because the release of patient information in the 
grievance context is not professional misconduct and had not been 
treated as such by the State previously in its dealings with PEF. 
Assuming, however, that the release of patient medical 
information in these circumstances could be considered to be 
professional misconduct, the ALJ held that the State's 
questioning of the employee was still per se improper. In 
reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied upon our decision in 
City of Newburcrh,-/ in which we held unlawful an employer's 
interrogation of a union representative regarding his 
conversations with and observations of an employee during a 
consultation involving potential disciplinary action. 
In its exceptions to the ALJ's decision in U-11327, the 
State argues that the ALJ erred in finding the patient complaint 
forms to be relevant to the grievances and in holding that those 
5/The ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation in U-11518 and no 
exceptions have been taken to her decision in that respect. 
^11 PERB 53108 (1978), conf'd, 70 A.D.2d 362, 12 PERB ^7020 (3d 
Dep't 1979). 
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forms are not confidential. In its exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision in U-11518, the State argues that its few questions to 
the employee were privileged, if not required, by various 
statutory and regulatory provisions which protect a patient's 
right to the confidentiality of medical records, a right which 
the State claims it may not waive under any circumstances. 
PEF in its response argues that the ALJ's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are correct and that her decision should 
be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, including those made at oral argument, we reverse the 
ALJ's decision in U-11518, but affirm her decision in U-11327. 
We begin with an analysis of U-11518 because it raises the 
issue of patient confidentiality, common to U-11327, more 
broadly. 
The issue in U-11518 is the scope of an employer's right to 
question an employee regarding what it considers to be job-
related misconduct. In this respect, we consider it irrelevant 
whether an employee's release of medical information is 
professional misconduct under law, regulation, work rule or 
policy and we make no findings in that regard. It is also 
unnecessary to decide whether and to what extent an employee may 
refuse to answer questions put to him or her by an employer. Nor 
do we decide whether an employee is entitled to the benefit of 
union representation during an employer's questioning. In this 
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case, the questions were asked of and answered by the employee 
with her union representative present. 
The State in this case had reason to believe that the 
employee may have engaged in conduct stemming from her employment 
relationship which directly affected her employment as a health 
care professional. This afforded the State a sufficient basis 
for the questioning, even assuming that the Act requires some 
basis as a condition to an employer's questioning of an employee. 
Unlike the ALJ, we do not consider the State's questioning of the 
employee to have "invaded the confidential relationship between 
the grievant and her union representative." In this case, the 
release of the medical information is itself the act of alleged 
misconduct and the questions asked by the State were intended 
simply to permit it to ascertain whether there had been an 
unauthorized disclosure of patient information. The State could 
have asked the employee whether she had released patient 
information to anyone without violating the Act because 
nonconsensual acquisition and release of that information was not 
protected by the Act. The narrower inquiry, concerning a 
possible disclosure to Yurkewicz, was based upon the information 
then in the State's possession, was essentially coincidental, 
and, therefore, made in good faith. No questions were asked of 
the employee regarding any communications she may have had with 
Yurkewicz concerning her grievances nor any he may have had with 
her. There were no inquiries regarding any advice sought or 
given as occurred in City of Newburgh, supra. Moreover, in City 
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of Newburcrh, the employee's communication with the union 
representative was not the act of misconduct which the employer 
was investigating. City of Newburcrh is, therefore, inapposite 
because neither the nature of the interrogation nor its scope was 
similar to the circumstances of the questioning conducted by the 
State in this case. 
The basic purpose of the privilege protecting the grievant-
representative relationship is to ensure to those parties the 
mutual right to freely consult with one another regarding any 
actual or potential grievances. The State itself recognizes that 
there must be a privilege attaching to communications between an 
employee and a union representative to facilitate the grievance 
process. It seeks only a recognition of the countervailing 
policies which protect the confidentiality of a patient's medical 
records.-7 The limited questions put to the employee by the 
State in this case did not threaten the employee's access to 
union representation nor did they jeopardize the purposes served 
by a grievant-representative privilege. By permitting the very 
preliminary type of questions asked in this case, we reach a 
reasonable accommodation between the patients' rights to the 
confidentiality of their medical records and an employee's rights 
under the Act. 
Different issues would, have been presented if the State had 
questioned the employee regarding her discussions with her 
^10 NYCRR §§405.7(b)(13), 405.7(c)(13), 405.10(a)(5); 8 NYCRR 
§29.1(b)(8); CPLR 4504. 
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grievance representative or if it had disciplined her for 
releasing patient information. We have no occasion on the facts 
of this case, however, to decide the extent of the State's rights 
to make further inquiries of an employee suspected of some job-
related misconduct or its rights to discipline in that regard. 
Turning to U-11327, we affirm the ALJ's decision requiring 
the release of the patient complaint forms. 
The documents requested by PEF were relevant to its 
investigation of the grievances and to its decisions as to 
whether and to what extent to process those grievances. The 
State's counseling memorandum was based directly upon those 
complaints and the grievances brought the merits and accuracy of 
those complaints into issue. Without the documents, PEF could 
not make a reasonably informed decision as to whether the patient 
complaints were accurately summarized by the State in its meeting 
with the employee, whether the grievances were meritorious or, 
even if so, whether other circumstances militated against their 
prosecution. Just as the State argues in conjunction with the 
questions it asked of the employee that it has a need to 
investigate instances of potential professional misconduct, PEF's 
need to investigate grievances on behalf of a unit employee is no 
less and that investigation cannot be conducted reasonably 
without the patient complaint forms. 
The State's primary argument regarding the confidentiality 
of the patient complaint forms is that they must be deemed 
confidential to permit patients the fullest freedom to exercise 
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their rights to complain about hospital care and services without 
fear of reprisals.-7 
The ALJ refused to equate a patient's right to complain 
about treatment or service without reprisal to a guarantee of 
confidentiality of the patient complaint forms and we agree. 
Central to our conclusion in this respect is that the patient 
complaint forms are not medical records and have not been 
considered or treated as such by the State. Therefore, whatever 
confidentiality may attach to patient medical records does not 
attach to the patient complaint forms. Moreover, the very term 
"patient complaint form" itself is a slight misnomer. The 
complaints in these cases were made by a relative of the 
patients, not the patients themselves. Indeed, the majority of 
the complaints at this medical facility are made by persons other 
than the patients. Having reviewed the several and varied 
sources of the asserted confidentiality of these documents, we 
find none which directly render them confidential and we cannot 
discern any legislative or administrative intent to render them 
such. -1 
^N.Y. 2Public Health Law §208-c(3)(c) (McKinney 1985); 10 NYCRR 
§§405.7(b)(22) & (23), 405.7(c)(17). 
-/Having held that the patient complaint forms are not 
confidential, we need not and do not decide whether the State's 
disclosures of patient complaint forms in the past or its 
summarization of parts of the at-issue complaints in its meeting 
with the employee can waive a patient's right to confidentiality 
of medical information. 
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Our conclusion in this respect is buttressed by another 
section of the Public Health Law. Under §230.11(a) of that law, 
reports to the office responsible for investigating complaints of 
professional medical conduct are specifically "confidential" and 
inadmissible "in any administrative or judicial proceeding . . . ." 
The enactment of this provision persuades us that the Legislature 
bestows confidentiality upon complaints regarding medical care 
clearly and explicitly when that is its intent. Given the defense 
difficulties which would be presented to employees if they were 
denied any access to patient complaints-7 which then become the 
basis for an employer's counseling or discipline, the 
confidentiality of those documents should not be assumed or 
implied, as the State would have us do. 
The State argues alternatively that it should at least be 
permitted to redact from the patient complaint forms any data 
which would identify the complainant. We have no occasion, 
however, to consider this issue. The State unqualifiedly refused 
to disclose the patient complaint forms and never offered to 
disclose any type of redacted document in response to PEF's 
demand. Beyond noting that it may be extremely difficult to 
allow the redaction of all potentially identifying data and yet 
-'These types of problems led the Appellate Division to order 
disclosure of patient complaints despite the restrictions of 
Public Health Law §230.11(a) in circumstances in which the 
complainants had testified at the disciplinary hearing. The 
Court held that the statutory proscription against disclosure had 
to yield to the accused's constitutional rights. McBarnette v. 
Sobol, 190 A.D.2d 229 (3d Dep't 1993). 
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extend to an employee a document useful to the investigation, 
evaluation and pursuit of a grievance, we can offer no guidance 
helpful to the parties in making or denying requests for patient 
complaint forms. The scope of disclosure in any given case will 
be dependent upon at least the nature of the demand for the 
patient complaint forms and the State's response to that demand, 
factors which will vary from case to case. Had the State 
provided a redacted copy of the requested forms, for example, we 
likely would have been presented with issues somewhat different 
than the ones we have under the State's refusal of PEF's demand. 
The ALJ also held that the State's refusal to provide PEF 
with the patient complaint forms per se violated §2 09-a.l(a) of 
the Act. The ALJ held in this respect that employees have a 
fundamental right to be represented in grievances and that the 
unprivileged withholding of relevant grievance information 
necessarily interferes with that right. 
We have recognized that the right of public employees to be 
represented in grievances is one of the most important afforded 
them by the Act.-7 We have also held that the deprivation of 
fundamental employee rights, however erroneous or innocent, per 
se violates §209-a.1(a).—' The denial of the patient complaint 
g/State of New York (Diaz) , 18 PERB f3047 (1985) , rev'd on other 
grounds, 132 A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB J[7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd, 73 
N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB }[7017 (1988). 
^State of New York, 10 PERB J[3108 (1977) (erroneous 
interpretation of the Act's contract bar rules causing an 
improper denial of representation access rights). 
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forms interfered with the employee's statutory right to be 
represented on the grievances. Therefore, we affirm the AKT's 
decision in this respect on the basis set forth in her decision. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, the 
State's exceptions in U-11518 are granted and the ALJ's decision 
in that case is reversed. The AKT's decision in U-11327 is 
affirmed and the State's exceptions in that case are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge in U-11518 must 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. In Case No. U-11327, the State 
is ordered to: 
1. Deliver to PEF the patient complaint forms which were 
the basis of an October 5, 1989 employee counseling 
memorandum if either of the grievances filed with 
respect to that counseling memorandum is still pending. 
2. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations 
normally used to post informational notices to unit 
employees employed at Roswell Park Memorial Institute. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter, L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) 
at Roswell Park Memorial Institute that the State of New York will deliver to PEF the patient complaint forms which were the 
basis of an October 5, 1989 employee counseling memorandum if either of the grievances filed with respect to that 




STATE OF NEW YORK-
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
ROSWELL PARK MEMORIAL INSTITUTE 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2D- 11/30/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CONNETQUOT CLERICAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3891 
CONNETQUOT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, SUFFOLK 
LOCAL 87 0, CONNETQUOT UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
KAPLOWITZ AND GALINSON (DANIEL 6ALINS0N of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
GUERCIO AND GUERCIO (GREGORY J. GUERCIO of counsel), for 
Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated April 30, 1993, the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed a 
petition filed by the Connetguot Clerical Association 
(Association), which seeks to fragment clerical employees of the 
Connetguot Central School District (District) from an existing 
blue-collar and white-collar noninstructional unit presently 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
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Local 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, Suffolk Local 870, Connetquot Unit 
(CSEA). 
In its exceptions to the Director's dismissal of the 
petition, the Association asserts that the Director erred when he 
found that the Association had not proven that CSEA provided 
inadequate and discriminatory representation to the clerical 
employees and that it had not shown a compelling need for the 
fragmentation of the clerical employees from the long-standing 
noninstructional unit. In particular, the Director determined 
that the evidence adduced over five days of hearing did not 
establish that CSEA had systematically and intentionally failed 
the clerical employees in contract negotiations, grievance 
administration or otherwise because of their job category or 
title. The Director also determined that there was not an 
inherent conflict of interest between the duties, working 
conditions, employment status, and other indicia of employment of 
the clerical employees and the other employees in the existing 
bargaining unit. 
We have carefully reviewed the exceptions, response and 
supporting briefs submitted by the Association and CSEA, together 
with the extensive record developed by the Director, and find 
that, for the reasons set forth in the Director's decision, and 
based upon his proper application of the facts of this case to 
the clearly enunciated standards established by this Board for 
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the fragmentation of existing bargaining units,-' the Director's 
decision should be affirmed and the Association's exceptions 
dismissed. It is our finding that the record, which is 
summarized in detail in the Director's decision, fully supports 
his material factual determinations and his legal conclusions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline'R. Kinsella,Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
^County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 25 PERB J[3 062 
(1992); Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
Buffalo. 24 PERB ?[3006 (1991) ; State of New York (Long Island 
Park, Recreation and Historical Preservation Comm'n), 22 PERB 
53043 (1989). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13083 
TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, 
Respondent. 
EDWARD J. HENNESSEY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JOHN J. LEO, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Town of Huntington (Town) excepts to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which, in relevant respect, finds 
that the Town violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) as alleged by Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees, United Marine Division, International 
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Local 342).-/ The ALJ held 
that the Town's Director of the Department of General Services, 
Glen LaMay, made statements and took actions at a meeting with a 
temporary employee, David Fusaro, who was at the relevant time in 
Local 342's blue-collar unit, which per se interfered with, 
-The ALJ dismissed that part of the charge which alleges that 
the Town violated the Act by refusing to answer an employee's 
grievance. No exceptions have been filed to that aspect of the 
ALJ's decision. 
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restrained and coerced Fusaro in the exercise of his protected 
rights to file and pursue grievances and to seek grievance 
representation by Local 342. 
The Town argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's decision 
should be reversed because LaMay's conduct and statements were 
not threatening or coercive and did not interfere with Fusaro's 
pursuit of the grievance. It also argues that the Town cannot be 
held accountable for LaMay's actions and that any violation is de 
minimis and premised upon a novel theory of law. In a point-by-
point response to the Town's exceptions, Local 342 argues that 
the ALJ's decision is correct in all respects and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The charge in this case is directed to LaMay's conduct and 
statements at a meeting with Fusaro called by LaMay on 
October 25, 1991. What was said and done there is not in 
dispute. Fusaro had filed a grievance on October 24, 1991, after 
being notified that he was terminated from his temporary laborer 
position effective October 26, 1991 due to "budget constraints". 
LaMay, believing that Fusaro had been misinformed about his 
rights by a Local 342 steward, called the meeting to give Fusaro 
some "counseling on procedures". The meeting x«/as attended by 
only LaMay and Fusaro and was in LaMay's office. After some 
preliminary conversation about the termination, LaMay told Fusaro 
that he had no seniority, that the grievance had no merit and was 
Board - U-13083 -3 
"not worth the paper it's written on". LaMay also told Fusaro: 
"You don't make friends this way. I don't know who told you to 
do this. You have no rights as a temporary worker." LaMay then 
tore up the grievance and threw it into a trash pail. 
Certain of the Town's exceptions are related to the merits 
of Fusaro's grievance or to the Town's possible procedural or 
substantive defenses to it. Those issues are, however, 
immaterial to this charge or its disposition because only LaMay's 
statements and conduct are challenged. Although the Town 
questions Fusaro's state of mind after the meeting with LaMay, it 
is similarly immaterial whether Fusaro was, in fact, intimidated, 
embarrassed or otherwise affected by that meeting.-7 The 
pertinent inquiry is whether LaMay's statements and conduct, 
objectively viewed, interfered with, restrained or coerced a 
reasonable employee's exercise of statutorily protected rights. 
We also reject the Town's argument that it cannot be held 
responsible for LaMay's actions. Our decisions in this respect 
do not require evidence of specific authorization, ratification 
or condonation of conduct by a supervisor or manager in that 
capacity as the sine qua non for attribution of liability to the 
employer.-f Moreover, LaMay was clearly acting within the scope 
of his employment in meeting with Fusaro regarding his grievance 
-'Patricia Sutherland, Local 3 42's shop steward, testified that 
Fusaro told her in a meeting shortly after the meeting with LaMay 
that he was humiliated and embarrassed by LaMay and that he felt 
that the grievance system did not work. 
^City of Schenectady, 26 PERB ?[3038 (1993) . 
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because LaMay is the step-one representative under the parties' 
grievance procedure. 
Public employees have certain fundamental statutory rights. 
Among these are the rights to file and pursue contract 
grievances, to seek advice from their bargaining agent regarding 
employment matters and to secure the benefit of union 
representation on any grievance. The existence of these rights, 
our recognition of them, and the impropriety of an employer's 
interference with them does not involve any novel theory of law. 
Nor have we ever considered an interference with such basic 
employee rights to represent only a technical or de minimis 
violation, not deserving of either a finding of violation or 
appropriate remedial action. To the contrary, our decisions 
reflect a careful scrutiny of any action by an employer which 
would tend to compromise or chill the exercise of rights 
associated with an employee's filing and pursuit of a contract 
grievance.-'' 
In its remaining exceptions, the Town argues that LaMay's 
conduct and statements were not per se threatening, coercive or 
otherwise an interference with Fusaro's grievance or 
representation rights. We find LaMay's conduct and statements to 
be as alleged by Local 342 and found by the ALJ. The 
circumstances under which the meeting was called and conducted-
LaMay's statements, particularly the one concerning Fusaro's 
-'See, e.g., State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Services)r 
26 PERB 1[3055 (1993) ; Town of Hempstead. 19 PERB ^3022 (1986) . 
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grievance not making him any friends, and his destruction of the 
grievance form itself would be intimidating and threatening to 
any reasonable employee, but all the more so to a temporary 
employee who had worked for the Town for only a few months before 
the meeting. Contrary to the Town's argument, LaMay's conduct 
and statements represent far more than simply his position on the 
merits of the grievance. LaMay by word and deed simultaneously 
conveyed to Fusaro his disrespect for the grievance process and 
the risks which might be posed to any employee who grieved or 
consulted with their union representative. As the ALJ correctly 
observed, LaMay's conduct and statements were premeditated and 
unprovoked.-'' In LaMay's zeal to convey to an employee his view 
of the employee's rights, LaMay clearly crossed the line between 
permissible counseling or grievance adjustment and improper 
interference with an employee's rights under the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are 
dismissed and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Cease and desist from indicating to Fusaro that he will 
be injured or impaired in any employment with the Town 
because of the filing or pursuit of his October 24, 
1991 grievance. 
^Compare New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. , 17 PERB J[3108 (1986) . 
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Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to unit 
employees represented by the Local 342 in the Blue-
Collar Unit. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
XLL, thJi 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Wal£e* L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member Y 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify the employees of the Town of Huntington in the Blue Collar Unit represented by Local 342, Long Island 
Public Service Employees, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, that the Town of 
Huntington will not indicate to David Fusaro that he will be injured or impaired in any employment with the Town because 
of the filing or pursuit of his October 24, 1991 grievance. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Town of Huntington 
.. tis Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY SHERIFFS 
SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4008 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY and CHAUTAUQUA 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer. 
THOMAS J. KRAJCI, for Petitioner 
MARK A. WINES, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Chautauqua County Sheriffs 
Supervisors' Association (Association) and Chautauqua County and 
the Chautauqua County Sheriff (Employer) to a decision rendered 
by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) on behalf of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 
The Association seeks to represent six currently 
unrepresented employees employed in the following titles: 
Captain, Lieutenant and Jail Supervisor/Administrator. The 
Assistant Director dismissed the petition after a hearing. He 
concluded that five of the six employees were managerial as 
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defined in §2 01.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) and, therefore, ineligible for representation.-1 He did 
not determine whether the remaining employee was managerial 
because, even if not, negotiating units of one employee are per 
se inappropriate.-7 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Assistant 
Director's decision is not supported by the record, which the 
Association claims clearly shows that the employees are only 
supervisors who are eligible for representation. The Employer 
argues that the Assistant Director's decision is correct on the 
facts in all material respects and on the law. It argues in 
cross-exceptions, however, that the Assistant Director should 
have found that the one employee as to whom there was no 
determination is also managerial. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the Assistant Director's decision as to all 
but Captain Dale W. Van Vlack. We are persuaded that the other 
employees have not been shown on this record to be managerial. 
The Assistant Director held that Captain Van Vlack, Jail 
Supervisor/Administrator Jeffrey N. Belson, and Lieutenants 
John W. Runkle and Andrew W. Lawrence are managerial because of 
their involvement in the preparation for and participation in 
^Managerial employees, in relevant respect, are those who 
"formulate policy".or who "may reasonably be required . . . to 
assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective 
negotiations . . . ." 
g/Auburn Indus. Dev. Auth. , 15 PERB 1(3139 (1982) . 
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negotiations on behalf of the Employer. He also found that these 
four and Lieutenant David E. Krieg are all involved, to varying 
degrees, in either drafting or advising the Sheriff regarding the 
issuance of General Orders, which establish departmental 
policy.-/ Accordingly, he held that a managerial determination 
was warranted for each as policy makers. 
The Association's exceptions to several of the Assistant 
Director's findings of fact are offered to support its contention 
that the employees' responsibility for "policy" is either 
nonexistent or very low-level and that their role in negotiations 
has been minimal and essentially "technical". We have reviewed 
these exceptions carefully as against the record as a whole and 
those specific parts cited by the Association. From that review, 
we conclude that, except as to Van Vlack, the Assistant 
Director's determination that the five employees are managerial 
is not supported by this record and is not in accordance with the 
criteria in §2 01.7(a) of the Act as interpreted. 
Captain Van Vlack supervises the uniformed patrols. 
Lieutenants Runkle and Krieg also supervise the uniformed patrol 
officers in the Road Division, alternating the day and night 
shifts. Supervisor Belson is responsible for the operation of 
-'The decision at one point refers erroneously to Lieutenant 
Jerome G. Adams as being one of the department's policy makers. 
The intended reference was clearly to Krieg. The Assistant 
Director did not make any determination regarding Adams' status 
as a managerial employee and he is the subject of the Employer's 
cross-exceptions. 
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the Chautauqua County Jail. Lieutenant Lawrence supervises the 
criminal investigations division. Lieutenant Adams operates the 
Training Academy. 
Although Runkle, Belson and Lawrence, to varying degrees, 
have all attended negotiating sessions, they have been, at most, 
resource persons. Their participation in discussions at the 
table or in caucuses has been minimal, if not nonexistent. Their 
discussion and review of the proposals submitted by the union 
which represents the rank-and-file employees in the Sheriff's 
Department is quite similar in type and degree to the duties we 
have found do not support a managerial designation.-'' That they 
may, as Sheriff John R. Bentley testified, occasionally "talk 
over" his position on union proposals and thereby learn "things", 
is too generalized and conclusory a basis for a managerial 
determination based upon labor relations responsibilities. 
This record also shows that these three employees and Krieg 
are only peripherally involved at a low level in the discussion 
and formulation of the policies governing the operation of the 
Sheriff's Department. This record as we view it shows these 
employees to be technicians and experts in their own areas of 
command responsibility who offer their input to the Sheriff as 
requested or expected. As important as their role is, they 
individually or collectively have not been shown on this record 
-See, e.g., Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 8 PERB K3095 (1975). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, remanded to the Director for further processing 
consistent with this decision. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
auline R. Kirisella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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to "regularly participate in the decision-making process by which 
departmental objectives and policies are formulated and 
implemented" .-/ 
As noted, the Assistant Director made no determination as to 
Adams. As he observed, however, the record as to Adams is, if 
anything, less persuasive of his managerial status than it is for 
the other employees. Having found that this record does not 
support the managerial status of any employee except Van Vlack, a 
fortiori, Adams has not been shown to be managerial. 
We affirm, however, the Assistant Director's decision as to 
Van Vlack. He is third in command in the Sheriff's Department 
and has been placed in charge of the department in the absence of 
the Sheriff or Undersheriff. As we view the record, Van Vlack is 
much more regularly and deeply involved in discussions concerning 
negotiations and policy formulation across division lines than 
the other employees. His role in these areas and others fairly 
makes him a member of the Sheriff's command staff for whom a 
managerial determination is reasonable. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
decision is reversed except as to his determination regarding 
Dale W. Van Vlack. The Association's remaining exceptions are 
granted and the Employer's cross-exceptions are dismissed. 
^Citv of Jamestown, 25 PERB ^[3015, at 3035 (1992) . 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNION-ENDICOTT MAINTENANCE WORKERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13534 
UNION-ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
C0U6HLIN & GERHART (FRANK W. MILLER of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Union-
Endicott Maintenance Workers Association (Association) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) on the Association's charge against the 
Union-Endicott Central School District (District). The 
Association alleges that the District transferred unit work in 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when an elementary school principal opened the school 
on two Saturdays in 1992 to permit the junior varsity girls' 
drill team to practice. The charge is premised on a theory that 
unit custodians have exclusivity over the opening and closing of 
school buildings for such purposes. 
After a hearing, the Director dismissed the charge on a 
finding that custodians do not have exclusivity over the work in 
issue. In reaching his decision, the Director also dismissed two 
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of the District's defenses-'' and he did not reach any other of 
the District's several defenses. 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that, the 
Director's statements notwithstanding, it did not repeatedly 
reshape or narrow its contention that there is a discernible 
boundary^ to the definition of the unit work within which its 
claim of exclusivity should be tested. Although conceding that 
its particular phrasings of the unit work may have varied, the 
Association argues that it has maintained consistently that only 
custodians opened and closed school buildings for weekend or 
holiday, school-sponsored, student activities involving athletic 
teams or extracurricular organizations which are normally 
scheduled at the middle school or high school. According to the 
Association, the Director's decision, which does not recognize 
this definition of the unit work, is not supported by the record. 
In cross-exceptions, which the District represents need not 
be considered unless the Director's decision on the merits is 
reversed, the District argues that the Director erred by 
rejecting some of its defenses and not ruling on others. It 
-/One alleges that a notice of claim pursuant to Education Law 
§3813 is a condition precedent to the filing of an improper 
practice charge and the other alleges that the charge is 
untimely. 
-
7We first recognized the concept of a discernible boundary to 
the definition of unit work in Town of West Seneca, 19 PERB f3 028 
(1986). Recognition of a discernible boundary to unit work 
allows a union to maintain its exclusivity within that boundary 
even if there is no exclusivity over the job function beyond that 
boundary. 
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argues, however, that the Director's decision is manifestly 
correct on the record and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
We do not consider it material to the disposition of this 
charge whether or to what extent the Association's articulation 
of its discernible boundary theory changed during the processing 
of the charge or remained consistent throughout. The issue 
before the Director and before us is simply how the unit work 
should be defined for purposes of applying our principles 
governing the transfer of unit work.-7 
The Association proposes that we define the unit work only 
by the circumstances in which nonunit individuals have not done 
that work because that narrow definition allows it to maintain 
the necessary exclusivity over the work. The unit work in any 
transfer case, however, is primarily defined by reference to the 
job duties performed by the unit employees.-7 The duty of the 
custodians involved here is the opening and closing of school 
buildings generally. Their job is not the opening and closing of 
only certain buildings at certain times for certain activities or 
events. As detailed at some length in the Director's decision, 
to which no factual error is attributed, many nonunit individuals 
have opened and closed school buildings many times under many 
-
7Niaqara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB K3083 (1985). 
^Town of Brookhaven, 26 PERB [^3066 (1993) . 
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different circumstances. We have not recognized a discernible 
boundary when we have been unable to identify a reasonable 
relationship between the components of the discernible boundary 
and the duties of the unit employees.-' The several components 
of the discernible boundary proposed by the Association are 
unrelated to the required duties of the custodians' position in 
any relevant respect. Therefore, the Director was correct in 
rejecting the Association's discernible boundary claim. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
In view of our affirmance of the Director's decision, we do not 
reach the District's cross-exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Cha 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
airperson 
5/ 2 See, e.g. . City of Buffalo, 24 PERB f3043 (1991) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14313 
COUNTY OP SUFFOLK, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Richard W. 
Glasheen to the dismissal, without hearing, of his improper 
practice charge which alleges a violation of §209-a.1(a), (b) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by the 
County of Suffolk (County). 
Glasheen, the Director of Facilities and Associate Professor 
of Facilities at Suffolk Community College (College), alleges 
that the College held "hearings" with his subordinates to receive 
complaints about him. Glasheen claims that, although the 
allegations made at those hearings are unsubstantiated, he 
received a mediocre evaluation which adversely affects his 
promotional opportunities. He characterized these actions as 
"attacks" against him by the College and an interference with his 
"right of enjoyment of the protection" of the collective 
bargaining agreement between his employee organization and the County. 
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Glasheen was notified by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) that 
his charge was deficient because the facts alleged would not 
establish a violation of §209-a.l(a), (b) or (c) of the Act. 
Glasheen then filed two amendments to the charge in which he 
alleged that the County denied his request to meet and discuss 
the negative comments made at the hearings and that his 
evaluation contained negative comments which made reference to 
his earlier improper practice charges.^ 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) thereafter dismissed the charge for the 
reason set forth in the deficiency letters sent to Glasheen. The 
Director held that no facts had been alleged which would 
establish the improper motivation required to sustain a violation 
of §209-a.l(a), (b) or (c). 
Glasheen excepts to the Director's decision because, he 
claims, it prevented him from making additional attempts to 
amend, clarify or correct the charge, it failed to consider his 
previous improper practice charges as a demonstration of the 
College's continuing animus toward him and it minimized the 
County of Suffolk, 25 PERB ^4650 (1992), aff'd, 26 PERB 
5[3029 (1993) ; County of Suffolk and Suffolk Community 
College, 25 PERB ^4513, aff'd, 25 PERB f3067 (1992); County 
of Suffolk and Suffolk Community College, 24 PERB ?[4565 
(1991) , aff 'd, 25 PERB [^3019 (1992) . All these charges were 
dismissed on the ground that the facts alleged did not 
establish the allegations pled. 
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significance of the comments made at the hearings and in the 
evaluation.-'' 
We affirm the Director's decision to dismiss Glasheen's 
charge for the reasons set forth below. 
As to Glasheen's second and third exceptions, we agree with 
the Director that the meetings held by the College and its 
evaluation of Glasheen are not, in and of themselves, violations 
of the Act and that Glasheen does not plead any facts evidencing 
any improper motive. Furthermore, contrary to his assertion 
otherwise, Glasheen's prior charges cannot establish a course of 
improper conduct by the College because they were dismissed for 
failure to plead a prima facie case.-7 
As to Glasheen's first exception, §204.1(b) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) requires a charging party to supply a clear and 
concise statement of the facts which support the alleged 
violations of the Act. The Director, pursuant to §204.2(a) of 
the Rules, must review an improper practice charge to determine 
if the facts pled would establish, if proven, a violation of the 
Act. If the Director should determine that the facts as alleged 
Glasheen also makes further allegations of animus against 
the College based on statements that are included for the 
first time in his exceptions. Facts which are not alleged 
in the improper practice charge and which are included for 
the first time in the exceptions may not be considered in 
support of the charge. Oswego City Sch. Dist., 25 PERB 
1[3052 (1992) . 
Glasheen admits in his exceptions that there is no improper 
motivation by the County nor involvement by the County in 
any of the actions which form the basis of this charge. 
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do not make out an improper practice, he is empowered to dismiss 
the charge without further notice. By practice, however, the 
Director gives charging parties notification of the deficiencies 
in their pleadings and an opportunity to withdraw the charge or 
to correct those deficiencies. Glasheen was afforded this 
opportunity and, in response, submitted his first letter of 
clarification, supplying certain information which he believed 
would evidence some improper motivation. Glasheen apparently had 
additional facts which, for some reason, he chose not to submit 
with his first clarification. He was, however, given another 
opportunity to provide additional facts which were necessary to 
support the allegations made in his original charge and the first 
clarification. Glasheen then filed a second clarification, with 
more facts. Thereafter, in his exceptions, he alleges still more 
facts in support of the improper practice charge. 
Glasheen had three opportunities to file a charge which 
conforms to our pleading requirements. He now asks for a fourth 
chance, and apparently any number of opportunities thereafter, if 
the fourth is insufficient, to correct the deficiencies in his 
charge. To accept Glasheen's theory of pleading would give a 
charging party limitless opportunities to file clarifications of 
charges, a result which is neither contemplated nor permitted by 
our Rules. The Director, in exercising his discretion pursuant 
to §204.1(d) of the Rules, was not required to accept further 
amendments or clarifications to the charge, having afforded 
Glasheen a reasonable opportunity to submit a charge which meets 
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the requirements of §204.1(d) of our Rules. Furthermore, notice 
of intent to dismiss the charge was not here required. 
Based on the above, the Director's dismissal of the charge 
is affirmed and Glasheen's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kihsella, Chairperson 
WalterjL. Eisenberg, Memt/er 
^SO^U^M 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OP ROCKLAND, CASE NO. DR-042 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
JACK SCHLOSS, DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Rockland (County) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing, as untimely, the 
County's petition for a declaratory ruling. The petition objected 
to the arbitrability of a proposal submitted by the Criminal 
Investigators and Senior Criminal Investigators of the Office of the 
Rockland County District Attorney (Union) to compulsory interest 
arbitration under §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). The County sought a ruling that the Union's proposal for 
a twenty-five year retirement plan is a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
The County was notified by the Director that the petition was 
untimely, but it declined to withdraw the petition. The Director 
thereafter issued a decision dismissing the petition as untimely. 
He, therefore, did not determine the negotiability of the Union's 
proposal. The County argues in its exceptions that the Director 
failed to determine whether a ruling would be in the public interest 
as required by §210.2 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) and that 
the processing of the Union's petition for interest arbitration was 
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not strictly in compliance with the Rules, which gave the County a 
good-faith belief that the time limits for filing its petition for a 
declaratory ruling would not be strictly enforced. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the 
Director. 
The Rules, at §205.6(c), provide that a petition for a 
declaratory ruling objecting to the arbitrability of any matter 
included in a petition for compulsory interest arbitration "may not 
be filed after the date of the filing of the response filed in 
accordance with §205.5" of the Rules. Section 205.5(a) of the Rules 
provides that a response to a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration "shall be filed within ten working days of receipt of 
the petition requesting arbitration." It is undisputed that the 
Union filed its petition for interest arbitration on October 31, 
1991, and that the County received it in November 1991. The 
County's declaratory ruling petition was not filed until March 26, 
1993,-' almost sixteen months after the Union's arbitration 
petition, and well beyond the ten working days permitted for the 
filing of a declaratory ruling petition. The County's petition is, 
therefore, patently untimely.-1 
The County argues in its first exception that the Director 
never made a determination as to whether the issuance of a 
-
7The County's response to the petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration was apparently also filed on that date. 
g/See Elmira PBA, Inc. . 25 PERB [^3072 (1992) . 
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declaratory ruling would be in the public interest as required by 
§210.2 of the Rules.-'' The County misconstrues the requirements of 
§210.2 in this respect. While the Director must determine if he 
will issue a declaratory ruling on the merits of a petition, he 
cannot reach the merits of a petition for a declaratory ruling if 
the petition is not timely filed. Timeliness is an initial 
requirement for processing, which a petitioner must satisfy before 
any merits determination may be made. The requirements of §210.2 
presume that the petition has satisfied the procedural requirements 
of the Rules, specifically §210.1 and §205.5. Since the instant 
petition did not satisfy the timeliness requirements of the Rules, 
the Director was not obligated to make a determination as to whether 
the policies of the Act would or would not be served by the issuance 
of a declaratory ruling. 
The County's second exception asserts that the Union's petition 
for compulsory interest arbitration was not processed in strict 
accordance with the Rules and, therefore, its late filing of the 
petition for a declaratory ruling should be excused. The County 
relies upon a September 18, 1991 amendment to §209.4 of the Act 
which included, for the first time, criminal investigators employed 
in the office of a district attorney within the group of public 
^Section 210.2(a) of the Rules provides, in pertinent part: 
The Director will determine whether the issuance of the 
declaratory ruling would be in the public interest as 
reflected by the policies underlying the act. 
Board - DR-042 -4 
employees entitled to compulsory interest arbitration. The Union 
had declared an impasse in its negotiations with the County on July 
2, 1991. A mediator was appointed by PERB's Director of 
Conciliation on July 9, 1991, and one mediation session was held on 
September 6, 1991, without resolution. After the above-referenced 
amendment became effective on September 18, 1991, the Union, on 
October 31, 1991, filed its petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration. The County is arguing that the Union should have filed 
an additional declaration of impasse after the effective date of the 
legislation which created a right to interest arbitration under the 
provisions of §209.4 of the Act. Since the Union's declaration of 
impasse was filed before it gained the right to compulsory interest 
arbitration under the Act, the County argues that the Union's 
petition for binding arbitration was not in strict compliance with 
the Rules and that the County's own failure to comply with the 
filing requirements of the Rules should be overlooked. 
The Union had a right under the Act to declare impasse whether 
or not it was entitled to binding arbitration.-7 That it declared 
impasse, as was its right to do, before it became entitled to 
compulsory interest arbitration, does not require it to begin the 
impasse procedure again after the effective date of the amendment to 
§209.4. The procedure for the declaration of an impasse is 
identical whether the parties are subject to fact-finding or binding 
arbitration. As noted above, the time limits for the filing of a 
^'Act, §2 09.3 and §209.4. 
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petition for declaratory ruling are clearly specified in the Rules. 
The County chose to disregard those time limits.-7 The minor 
irregularity it perceives in the Union's filing of its petition for 
compulsory interest arbitration did not excuse the County's 
manifestly late filing and did not extend its time to file the 
petition for a declaratory ruling.-1 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the County's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
-'Apparently, the County asked for and received an extension of 
time in which to file its response to the petition for compulsory 
interest arbitration to December 29, 1991. It did not file its 
response, however, until March 26, 1993, over the Union's 
objection. 
-''indeed, the Director of Conciliation rejected the same argument 
when raised by the County in January 1992. He noted: "The change 
in finality under the Taylor Law's impasse procedures does not 
affect, or in any way change, the significance or propriety of 
the Declaration of Impasse filed with this office...." 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, 
LIVINGSTON COUNTY LOCAL 82 6, 
LIVINGSTON COUNTY EMPLOYEE UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-13224 & 
U-13435 
COUNTY OP LIVINGSTON, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS, BEACH & WILCOX (CARL R. KRAUSE and ANDREA M. BASILE 
TERRILLION of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Livingston County Local 826, 
Livingston County Employee Unit (CSEA) and the County of 
Livingston (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). Each of the charges alleges that the County transferred 
exclusive unit work in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it replaced full-time 
unit employees with part-time, nonunit employees. The charges 
involve employees in the following titles: Home Energy 
/ 
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Assistance Program (HEAP) Examiner, Probation Officer and Senior 
Clerk at the County's skilled nursing facility. 
The ALJ dismissed the charges except as to the Probation 
Officer. The ALJ held that CSEA had exclusivity over the unit 
work of a Probation Officer as that work was defined by that 
specific job title. The ALJ held, however, that CSEA had no 
exclusivity over the work of a Senior Clerk because the County 
regularly had assigned the full range of a Senior Clerk's duties 
to nonunit, part-time personnel in several County departments. 
The ALJ also dismissed the charge as it applies to the HEAP 
Examiner. According to the ALJ, CSEA's exclusivity in relevant 
respect was limited to the work of a full-time, "hybrid" position 
characterized by the ALJ as "HEAP Examiner/Clerical". Occupants 
of this full-time position did HEAP work seasonally, from January 
to_AprjJL, and. varied clerical duties from May to December. The 
ALJ held that CSEA did not have exclusivity over the work of the 
seasonal HEAP Examiner employed annually from only January to 
April because nonunit personnel had served in that seasonal 
capacity in the past. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision regarding the HEAP 
Examiner. The County excepts to the ALJ's decision regarding the 
Probation Officer. No exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's 
decision regarding the Senior Clerk. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in not 
finding that the use of seasonal HEAP Examiners is an improper 
unilateral transfer of exclusive unit work because the duties of 
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the HEAP Examiner have been exclusive to its unit since 1988 when 
the County stopped using seasonal employees in that title. CSEA 
attaches no significance to the full-time HEAP Examiners' regular 
performance of clerical duties during part of the year. The 
HEAP-specific duties, according to CSEA, were exclusive to its 
unit and only those duties, not the clerical duties, are the 
subject of its charge. 
The County argues in its cross-exceptions that the ALT was 
correct in holding that the work of HEAP Examiners is not 
exclusive unit work. It argues, however, that the ALJ erred in 
finding a violation of the Act with respect to the Probation 
Officer because that hiring is consistent with its long-standing 
use of part-time and seasonal employees in many of the same job 
titles as are staffed by full-time employees. The County also 
argue^^that CSEA waivjed—any^further^right—to bargain-regarding 
the use of part-time employees.by specific agreement and conduct 
during negotiations for a successor to the parties' 1989-91 
contract. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision as to the Probation 
Officer and affirm, on different grounds, her dismissal of the 
allegations regarding the HEAP Examiner. Our decision is 
premised upon a waiver by agreement, a theory applicable equally 
to the two titles in dispute. Therefore, we have- no occasion to 
consider CSEA's exceptions or other of the County's cross-
exceptions . 
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Article II §1 of the parties' agreement provides as follows: 
The Employer retains the sole right to manage its 
business and services and to direct the working force, 
including the right to decide the number and location 
of its business and service operations, the business 
and service operations to be conducted and rendered, 
and the methods, processes and means used in operating 
its business and services; and the control of the 
buildings, real estate, materials, parts, tools, 
machinery and all equipment which may be used in the 
operation of its business or in supplying its services; 
to determine whether and to what extent the work 
required in operating its business and supplying its 
services shall be performed by employees covered by 
this Agreement; to maintain order and deficiency in all 
its departments and operations, (emphasis added) 
The ALJ held that this provision was not specific enough to 
evidence a waiver of bargaining rights, which must be clear and 
unmistakable.-7 In reaching her decision, the ALJ relied upon 
County of Broome-7 and City of Poughkeepsie,-7 two cases in 
which we held that management rights clauses did not constitute a 
waiver-. Our_finding_o.f —a_waiv.er—in—this—case, however-,—is — 
entirely consistent with those decisions. 
The management rights clause in County of Broome is not 
similar to the contract provision in this case. First, the 
clause under review in County of Broome did not contain any 
language which gave the employer any right to use nonunit 
I7CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 17011 (3d Dep't 1982), 
appeal dismissed. 57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 PERB 17020 (1982). 
i722 PERB f3019 (1989) . 
5715 PERB 13045 (1982), conf'd. 95 A.D.2d 101, 16 PERB 17021 
(3d Dep't 1983), appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 859, 16 PERB 17027 
(1983). 
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personnel in the delivery of its services. Second, the 
employer's rights in County of Broome were qualified by a proviso 
which stated they could only be exercised "subject to the 
limitations provided in the Law . . . ." In this case, the 
County's management rights, in relevant respect, are specific and 
the exercise of those rights is not restricted. 
Language restricting the employer's management rights was 
also present in City of Poughkeepsie. The management rights 
clause in City of Poughkeepsie was identical to that here in 
relevant respect with the important distinction that a separate 
section of the same clause subjected the employer's exercise of 
any contractual management right to "such regulations governing 
the exercise of said rights as . . . provided in Article 14 of 
the Civil Service Law . . . ." The Board in that case found that 
the—management^jrights—clause—was—not a—waiver of—the—union's 
bargaining rights because there was unrebutted testimony from the 
union that the City's right to subcontract was specifically 
intended to be limited by its duty to negotiate under the Act and 
because the City's own conduct evidenced that it understood and 
agreed that the clause had the meaning which had been ascribed to 
it by the union in its testimony. 
None of the factors which persuaded the Board in City of 
Poughkeepsie is present here. The specific grant of management 
right is unqualified and unrestricted and there is no evidence of 
negotiating history or conduct to suggest that the clause means 
something other than what it plainly states. To the contrary, 
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the County's practice of utilizing nonunit employees in many 
positions which have parallel full-time unit titles supports the 
conclusion that in this case, unlike City of Poucrhkeepsie, the 
parties mutually understood and agreed that the County had the 
right to use part-time or seasonal employees in the delivery of 
its services. Whether such part-time or seasonal employees would 
be appropriately added to CSEA's unit is not before us. 
A union and an employer may satisfy by agreement their 
mutual duty to bargain a given subject, and thereby waive any 
further bargaining rights regarding the exercise of that contract 
right, without expressly stating in their contract that it was 
reached pursuant to the Act and was intended to fulfill the 
entirety of their statutory bargaining duty on that particular 
subject. Such a level of specificity has never been required as 
a—condition—to—a—finding—of—waiver—by—agreement—ei-ther—by—this 
Board or in any other forum of which we are aware. We have, to 
the contrary, found a waiver by agreement in contract clauses 
which are broad when we have been persuaded that the language is 
a clear grant of right to the employer with respect to the 
subject matter of the improper practice charge.-7 The 
particular management rights clause in issue here, which gives 
the County the right "to determine whether and to what extent the 
work required in operating its business and supplying its 
services shall be performed by employees covered by [the] 
-
/rTown of Greece, 26 PERB [^3032 (1993) ; Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist. , 
21 PERB 13021 (1988). 
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Agreement" is at least as specific as other agreements which have 
been held to constitute a waiver of further bargaining rights.-7 
In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate that a waiver of 
bargaining rights is not to be implied and is not to be extended 
to circumstances not clearly encompassed by the parties7 
agreement. Where that waiver, however, is premised upon the 
parties7 mutual agreement to afford an employer an unqualified 
right to take a certain action, we would distort the bargaining 
process and drain the agreement of its plain meaning by finding 
that the exercise of that right violated the employer7s duty to 
bargain. 
In this case, the hiring of a part-time HEAP Examiner and a 
part-time Probation Officer was consistent in nature and scope 
with the County7s past utilization of part-time and seasonal 
employees. In that regard, we do not consider it dispositive 
that the County has not previously hired a part-time Probation 
Officer or has not used a seasonal HEAP Examiner since 1988. 
Although relevant to a consideration of CSEA's exclusivity, the 
nonutilization of nonunit personnel in certain positions is not 
relevant to the County7s exercise of contract right. The 
County7s management right, as granted and as exercised, crosses 
departmental lines and particular positions. The absence for 
some time of a perceived need for a part-time Probation Officer 
or a seasonal HEAP Examiner does not extinguish the County7s 
-See, e.cr. , County of Nassau, 26 PERB ^3052 (1993) . 
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rights under the contract to utilize part-time employees 
consistent with its needs as determined at any given time. 
For the reasons set forth above, the County's exceptions 
regarding waiver by agreement are granted and the ALJ's decision 
in that respect is reversed. We do not reach CSEA's exceptions 
or the County's remaining cross-exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
£fi J.l^ iLkxfY^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
'-"•-•—— L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J< Schmertz, Member T 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FIREFIGHTING TEACHERS AND 
EMERGENCY SERVICE INSTRUCTORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-409 6 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND EXTENSION 
BOARD OP THE COUNTY OP SUFFOLK, 
Employer. 
SCHLACTER & MAURO (REYNOLD MAURO, of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
RAINS & POGREBIN (RICHARD ZUCKERMAN of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On April 30, 1993, the United Firefighting Teachers and 
Emergency Service Instructors Association (petitioner) filed a 
petition seeking to represent a unit of employees of the 
Vocational Education and Extension Board of the County of 
Suffolk. Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following is the appropriate 
negotiating unit: 
Included: Fire academy instructors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Board - C-4096 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held to determine the wishes of the employees on October 15, 
1993, at which twenty-two votes were cast against representation 
by the petitioner, and thirteen in favor of representation by the 
petitioner; there were no challenged ballots. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED, that the petition 
should be, and hereby is dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
%J[ / , IA11V£W>&4 
Pauline R. Kinse l la , Chairperson 
Walter ,L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4150 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority Superior Officers Association has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Lieutenants - Fire Division. 
Certification - C-4150 - 2 -
Excluded: All other Employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority Superior Officers Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
^TuJt>JL^.,St , .- i. -- ,. ,^fv*A\s^ . 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
(MMfc- ^ ' 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HYDE PARK EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4148 
HYDE PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4148 - 2 -
Unit: Included: Bus drivers, custodians, groundsmen, cleaners, 
maintenance men, mechanics, cafeteria workers, 
school bus dispatchers, couriers and painters 
of the District and any other classification or 
category that may be established that falls 
within the intent in the certified unit. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
'fet-h-^- T-WK-IASJI 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4145 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All those employed in the following titles: 
Airfield Foreman, Maintenance Facilities 
Supervisor, Maintenance Foreman, Fuel Farm 
Supervisor, Assistant Fuel Farm Supervisor, 
Certification - C-4145 
- 2 -
Motor Equipment Maintenance Foreman, Assistant 
Motor Equipment Maintenance Supervisor, 
Electrical Superintendent, and Assistant to 
Airport Manager. 
Excluded: Airport Manager, Properties Superintendent, 
Airfield Superintendent, Assistant Airport 
Manager and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
tJc^LL.ll 
Pauline R. Kinsella/ Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUBSTITUTES UNITED IN BROOME, NYSUT 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4137 
CHENANGO VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4137 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOHARIE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4110 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Schoharie County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-4110 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Sheriff's Department employees. 
Excluded: All persons in the unclassified service, in the 
exempt class of the classified service of Civil 
Service, the Sheriff, Under Sheriff, 
Lieutenants (including Chief Deputy), and 
Confidential Secretary. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Schoharie County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Line R. Kinsella, Ct. Paul hairperson 
/U^UL. Z^ zL^^^^r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric> Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARATOGA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4101 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Saratoga County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association has been designated and selected 
j^y a maj o n «»y CJ. uis empxoyees o±. uie a.uove—nsitisu puuxic 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
Certification - C-4101 
- 2 -
f "\ 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Sheriff's Department. 
Excluded: Elected officials, Undersheriff, Chief Deputy, 
Chief Deputy/Corrections , Confidential 
Secretary to the Sheriff and part-time and 
temporary employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Saratoga County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 30, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric •J/' Schmertz, Member T 
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GRIEVANCE AND INTEREST ARBITRATION PANELS 
A candidate for appointment to the grievance arbitration panel 
must demonstrate satisfactory experience as a labor arbitrator. 
Applications for appointment to the panel must include the applicant's 
vita, five recent arbitration awards written by the applicant, and a 
listing of all awards rendered in the past two years, such listing to 
include the names of the parties, the nature of the issue(s) involved, 
and the appointing authority. Exceptions to the arbitration award 
requirements may be made for persons who have five or more years of 
relevant and appropriate professional employment with a federal, state 
or municipal agency charged with the administration of a labor 
relations statute and who, by education, training, experience or other 
objective criteria, can demonstrate such outstanding competence and 
stature in the field of labor relations as to assure the Board of their 
ability to serve effectively as a labor arbitrator, and such that their 
appointment to the panel would be of substantial value to the agency, 
its clientele and public. Candidates must be residents of, or maintain 
bona fide business offices within, the State of New York, or a location 
immediately contiguous thereto. Consistent with staffing needs and 
caseload demands, the Director of Conciliation should recommend to the 
Board such persons as are determined to have met the necessary 
standards and criteria. 
A candidate for appointment to the interest arbitration panel must 
demonstrate substantial experience both as a labor mediator and labor 
arbitrator, and must be a member of PERB's mediation, fact-finding and 
grievance arbitration panels. Consistent with staffing needs and 
caseload demands, the Director of Conciliation should recommend to the 
Board such persons as are determined to have met the necessary 
standards and criteria. 
A member of the grievance or interest arbitration panel may be 
removed by the Board for good reason as determined by the Board, 
including, without limitation, a failure, refusal or inability to 
comply with or maintain any of the standards, criteria or policies 
governing appointment to or service on a panel, such as service as an 
advocate in matters of labor relations or labor standards, or extended 
periods in which a member is not selected or assigned to a dispute 
despite availability. 
MEDIATION AND FACT-FINDING PANELS 
A candidate for appointment to the mediation and fact-finding 
panels must demonstrate by education, training and experience, or other 
objective criteria, an ability to serve effectively as a labor mediator 
or fact finder. Candidates must be residents of, or maintain bona fide 
business offices within, the State of New York, or a location 
immediately contiguous thereto. Consistent with staffing needs and 
caseload demands, the Director of Conciliation should recommend to the 
Board such persons as are determined to have met the necessary 
standards and criteria. 
A member of the mediation or fact-finding panel may be removed by 
the Board in the same manner and upon the same terms as members of the 
grievance and interest arbitration panels. 
